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 Felix Maier 
Expectations of the Non EU-Partner 
countries after Marseilles 
Due to the fact that I myself as a Swiss, by definition neutral, have no clue 
neither about the Mediterranean nor the European Union. But apart from 
this fact, I think that the title “expectations after Marseilles” includes in fact 
two nearly impossible elements, I would like to elaborate on that and come 
then perhaps to a conclusion. But nevertheless, as a director of an institu-
tion in the middle of the Mediterranean, in the middle of the process, where 
all 27, especially the 12 non EU partner states can and do meet, I think I 
have a certain responsibility. And therefore it makes sense to look from this 
point of view. When I speak about impossibilities or difficulties of this t i-
tle, t hen I mean first of all the expectations of the non-EU Mediterranean 
countries, what does that mean? It has to do with perceptions and therefore 
it’s very important that there is something like a common perception as the 
Mediterranean view or the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean as such 
would be something unique, it is unique, but a unified, a monolithic block. 
I think it’s a very often, I would name it, error, a quite common error that 
the Mediterranean is a monolithic, homogenous entity. This is far away, I 
think, from the realities, I think it’s as far wrong or as far from the reality, 
as we speak normally about Africa and forgetting that Africa is 53 coun-
tries and we treat it just as one unique block, say, a little bit as with the 
Mediterranean. 
First of all the Mediterranean is a geographic reality, nothing else than that. 
And there are a few things, someone has to understand why a process like 
the Barcelona process or every other integration process can work or 
doesn’t work, or whatever can be criticised, we should have a look on this Felix Maier 
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what I call this error, it is geographical first. But then we have to see that 
the difference in speed of development around this “bassin Méditerranéen” 
is so different that it is nearly impossible to put on that something common. 
I mean it doesn’t speak against a process like the Barcelona process as 
such, but if we forget that and we risk to permit a lot of logical errors out of 
this circumstance. It is and there is something in common, it is , let’s say, a 
interface Mediterranean where all the things are coming together. I myself 
prefer this view that we say in the Mediterranean are coming together the 
three big monotheistic religions, the big two, let’s say, in this sphere of the 
world, dominating cultures, the Christian Northern European dominated 
cultures with the Arabic dominated culture, is interfacing here together  – 
it’s all together with all this cultural and economic consequences. That 
means that the Mediterranean area and this is important I think to under-
stand, that any process which would be either forced or managed in the 
way that the partners share the same history, share the same experience is 
bound to fail. Of course we`re facing the same problems and threats. Just in 
brackets, too, for example environmental, I mean 65 %, if I’m not wrong, 
of the E uropean oil transports are going through the street of Mesina and 
you can imagine what it means for the vulnerability of the area, for exam-
ple Malta, 30 % of our income coming from tourism. We don’t need an 
Exxon  Valdez  - our own flag ship Erika, you’ve heard about it, is enough 
to destroy the economic base and cultural base for the next 15 years of that 
country. So, there we have common interest. I think we should look more 
into the common interest and the share of history and the common concerns 
than in that what we perceive sometimes as monolithic block. I think espe-
cially for the North, if I may say so, we would wish or I think it would 
make sense to see more the diverse the individualistic approach within 
partnership and less consider it as a block. Today, it is very fashionable to 
criticise the Barcelona process. It has failed, it hasn’t worked, whatever. I 
think, here also, we have to take care, I mean, something like that, I would 
like to quote the late president Mittérrand. ”You can’t, what has been and 
we have to look at the history of the Mediterranean  – we share a common 
history. You have over hundreds of thousand of years of war, of blood, of 
conquership whatever”. You can’t expect within 5 years that everything is Expectations of the Non EU-Partner countries after Marseilles 
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as you say in German “Friede, Freude, Eierkuchen”, that everybody loves 
everybody and does everything together. We have to be realistic. I think we 
shouldn’t overstretch also the expectations, because this leads, this espe-
cially thinking in this block, monolithic block approach, that what we are 
suffering in this process. I think we might view it as one of the key prob-
lems that we think in terms of “we” and “them”. It’s always we, the South, 
together or against or without whatever and the other way round, too. And I 
can tell you as responsible for twice a year organise the workshops infor-
mation and training seminars for the Barcelona process in Malta. It’s we 
and them, this has to do with the wrong perception, I think, of the region, as 
I said, more than once “monolithic”.  
A second problem, a second area of the title of my contribution is “After 
Marseille”. It has to be seen, what was before or has something changed 
after Marseille? In my view, from the substantial point of view, absolutely 
nothing has changed substantially. But I think on the perception it is a tre-
mendous step that has been done, namely, as I said before, to criticise and 
to call the Barcelona process already bad and failed. This declaration, this 
commitment of the people present  in Marseille, is absolutely crucial. To 
say “No, we are committed.” We have to ask a little bit later on the con-
crete expectations of what that means in real terms. But the fact that the 27 
said: “Okay, we want to go on with the Barcelona process” is a step for-
ward, perhaps not a big one, not a dramatic one, not a spectacular one. It 
doesn’t create a lot of headlines in the newspapers, but is a very, very i m-
portant result. We are going to be committed. 
After this preliminary remarks I try to walk in what is the area which we 
deal with. We come to these expectations, what we have to speak about. 
Expectations mean, at least as I see it, aim on three different levels. On ex-
pectations there are more or less dreams, there are miracles expecting, there 
are illusions. There is a second category: there are ambitions. On the third 
category there are expectations, that are more or less realistic or I like the 
German word “realpolitische Ansätze”, the realistic approaches, the modest 
approach. We have then to ask what are those expectations.  Felix Maier 
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Let me just mention the first category of these expectations: the dreams, the 
miracles and the illusions. It’s a little bit a risky because the problem as 
such is tragic and they are very difficult and I think there can be more said 
about it, but at the same time one of the big problems of the process as such 
is the whole issue of the Middle East. Process peace or non-peace. A proc-
ess which sometimes keeps the whole Barcelona process as hostage blocks 
everything. Sometimes I’m not completely sure. There are moments when 
we see that there what’s going on is really making impossible further a c-
tivities and sometimes it’s even only an excuse, but anyhow this kind of 
expectation, I think it would be overstretch the Barcelona process if we 
would aid to solve or substantially contribute to contribute to a solution of 
the conflict. I think the nature of the conflict and especially its complexity 
is much more higher than the complexity of the system of the Barcelona 
process. And I think it’s impossible to solve, due to this fact, within that 
framework. And I think not that the Barcelona process shouldn’t expect 
anything in this regard, but I think that it belongs classically to the category 
of dreams, of miracles and of illusions. We should of course avoid anything 
that could make this solution more complicated. But in a positive way to 
contribute I think this is too much expected, and it’s an illusion and it’s not 
realistic. 
The third category, namely the realistic or the modest approach, leaves us 
to, that we say: Okay, we are already satisfied, if the process as such is go-
ing on, if it can maintain the status quo, which again is already a success in 
my view in itself, compared with the last two thousand years. And we are 
happy to have what we h ave with slow steps forward. And I think espe-
cially in this context it’s very important. I think the only way how we can 
do things also here is with all the difficulties, all the problems we are awa-
re, is to go on. I think there are not very many alternatives to such and such 
programs. It would be made perhaps more efficient. It doesn’t speak  a-
gainst the program as such. I think that this is important that it has been 
confirmed in Marseille. The program has to go on. 
And the second category here: the ambitions. This is that where we have to 
spend a little bit time and look what could that be in concrete. The Barce-
lona process is aiming high but in a very idealistic way. Here just one r e-Expectations of the Non EU-Partner countries after Marseilles 
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mark in brackets. And to make myself clear. The problem especially in this 
category is that: when we have looked in the final statement of the meeting 
of the ministers in Marseille, I think this itself raises expectations which are 
completely irrealistic. The expectations are not the sheer figure or the total-
ity of the topics there is definitely too much. I come back on that in a short 
moment. I think we need something like a privatisation, but that means 
there is a lot of indications, too. Now the expectation is one side, the cate-
gories we have seen. But the question is to whom do we address these ex-
pectations? Here I would like to underline just without too much going into 
details, too often we address them to “them” without saying exactly whom 
we mean. I think not very often it’s clear  – there is the South, the North. 
And this is for sure in my view the wrong way, because the partnership 
whatever it means with our individual experience, with working or not 
working partnerships in our daily life is never a one way, normally it 
should be a two way procedure.  
What could be a way out, what could be a concretisation of that what I said 
before. Namely first we have this block thinking. We have something in 
common, but we are different. We have to look what means the expecta-
tions and we need to address now, what after Marseille, is just a point in 
time than a real turning point, where we are now. I would make four differ-
ent expectations. 
First of all, to the process as such. I think that it’s clear that the process as 
such – a banality of course, but it is much more difficult to realise – should 
go under all conditions on. On what level ever, if it is a lower level, or a 
higher or whatever, I think because there is no alternative for the moment. 
Of course theoretically a lot of things are possible or could be thought. But 
for the moment there is no alternative to the Barcelona process. We have to 
be completely aware about that. This is very important. We take it too 
much for granted. But we have to. It is the only alternative we have avail-
able for the moment. We should take care to it. Perhaps this process should 
be made much more visible. For the moment it is something that happens 
on a very high level We have the ministerials, we have the representatives 
or the ambassadors, the special Committee and that it’s and sometimes 
even the project is not absolutely clear. Who is behind them. I think the Felix Maier 
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visibility of the Euro-Med-Process is a core problem. The PR aspect could 
be much more improved in favour of exactly what I said before: raising or 
increasing the awareness or reducing the perception of we and them. But 
we see this is something that works in daily life. Not only that we write on 
our nice maps we gather or we distribute sponsored by. Of course not or 
that we really bring that into the daily awareness of the people. 
First, we are neglecting the fact that it is a completely asymmetric process. 
That means that in terms of the system theory, that the complexity of the 
whole approach is that much, that it’s not possible to deal with it with a 
simple process and in structures. Consequence and one of the expectations 
I would formulate in the context of an expectation process is such, is per-
haps we have to think about the structure of the Barcelona process. Is it the 
correct structure and there is nothing against the “meta-Committee”, abso-
lutely not. This is very good and very good working – it is perhaps, it has to 
be, speaking for more structures, because I think structures should follow 
strategies and not the other way round. And Malta is perhaps sometimes 
exactly the proof of this. I think in this process we could need a little bit 
more of structure, exactly also to make it more visible. And when I think 
about strategies and structures, then the strategy should be to increase the 
complexity of the process. And we reach a level where we are able to deal 
with this high complex asymmetric interdependence of the region. And I 
think this is really worth that there should be invested much more time and 
energy, thinking, perhaps also money than we did it before.  
A second expectation and I think this is an address to everybody of us, that 
we can’t  – if we like it or not, more or less we don’t like it – to put priori-
ties. This is also a very banal remark, I know, because we normally forget 
the second part of the sentence. Setting priorities means setting at the same 
time post-priorities. And when I read the ministerial final document, I have 
some doubts and I have my problems. Everything is a priority. Everything 
is emphasised – only one point in the second basket, for example, there are 
11 lines emphasising, increasing  – we should do, we are putting priority on 
– this is simply not possible. And not only because it’s an asymmetric i n-
terdependence procedure, it is no way possible. And I think, I don’t have to 
tell you that everybody has to do with everything even in life. I can’t spend Expectations of the Non EU-Partner countries after Marseilles 
 11 
it twice or three times, I can only spend it once. And then I have to decide 
what I do with this. We stop cheating ourselves in giving the impression 
that we can do everything. And this is perhaps also to address all the people 
who are preparing this process, documents whatever. Please calm down, 
come a little bit down. A little bit less would be much more than to touch 
everything. I think the expectation must be that the three baskets remain  – 
no doubt about that. But to prioritise the baskets, what should be done first. 
In my view it’s clear. It’s the second basket, the economic basket. Because 
through economic integration we will have political integration. At least the 
condition for it politically, not an automatism, but at least a condition for a 
political integration because it is Charta and all these things can’t work due 
to that what I said before, in addition to what you as a team are researching 
on it. And within that, let’s define a few, but visible and measurable steps 
that could be done quite quick. The process as such and its priorities by the 
way leads all to the more flexibility  – it is for the moment a very static ap-
proach. Due to this  – it’s one big sausage you know. You don’t know 
what’s the beginning and the end. And in between you don’t see peaks, you 
don’t see anything going up. It’s just one big large sausage full of a lot of 
good ideas, but without anybody believing that this way it can be realised. 
And that in the end of the day it has to do with the credibility of the process 
as such. If you prioritise everything, I think we are not very credible.  
So, a third expectation needs to be addressed to the South partner states. I 
think we should really and this is not, it’s also not very new. We should 
really start to do something in the field of making more and a better use of 
the intraregional cooperation and then addressing the member side, that we 
reinforce and strengthen our cooperation. I think this is a very important 
expectation. Especially in the context of Barcelona, because the thinking of 
them and us as I labelled it a little bit short, I’m sure, it is not taking into 
consideration the whole complexity. We are too passive in waiting until 
something is falling down like manna from heaven. I mean manna in Brus-
sels is mostly in the form of money on our desert island or whatever it is. I 
think we should instead of complaining, that we and I quote here only my 
own country, I’m not responsable for all the others. But that we say, we are 
a beautiful island, there is a lot of sun with blue sky but nothing else. It’s Felix Maier 
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completely wrong. We have at least our rain, we have our creativity, we 
have a lot of things more. Instead of sitting there complaining how poor we 
are. I mean also that very much shortened, I f ully agree. But I think there 
should be done an effort much, much more which would instead of just de-
clamating we need reinforcement of the Barcelona process. We can’t d e-
crete the reinforcement of the Barcelona process. It’s not possible. We can 
just make  it work, that’s all. And as I said, we have to make it work. The 
Barcelona process as such is not existing. It is existing through our com-
mitment, through our work. And we have to do it. We can’t delegate it. 
There are possibilities which are not yet explored. All in all, again for me 
or for our side, important is that we on the way of a stereotype thing of a 
monolithic clear, well-defined I wouldn’t say block, but region-area, which 
is clearly defined, which has everything more that we come to a more dif-
ferent, specially this expression taking into consideration, this asymmetric, 
I think is much more interesting than only complex, this asymmetric really 
describes the process situation and therefore the solutions for a lot of prob-
lems we are facing and that  we are perhaps underestimating the potential of 
the problems. 
 
 Christian Sterzing 
Germany and the Barcelona-Process – Set-
ting Priorities 
I would like to talk a little bit about the perception of this Barcelona proc-
ess in Germany and answer may-be the question: What did we learn of 
these experiences with five years of the Barcelona process? I think the e u-
phoria about the Barcelona process has vanished. We have heard about the 
great expectations, the hopes, the ambitions and now, Marseille was a 
chance to sum up some kind of conclusion to see what has happened, what 
didn’t happen. I think the Commission has listed all the shortcomings, the 
deficits of the Barcelona process in the last five years in the report of Sep-
tember 2000. And I don’t want to repeat them. But I think looking at the 
process in a more realistic way, does not have to be a euphemism for being 
very disappointed. I think looking in a more realistic way, means also that 
we have learnt very much in this process. And I think this in general opens 
new possibilities to talk about the future and to talk about new priorities in 
this process.  
First of all, let me mention that in Germany  – and when I’m talking about 
Germany, I mean the political class right now  – in Germany the perception 
of the Mediterranean region has changed during the last years. We have a 
single market since a few year. And many people realise that Germany lies 
at the banks of the Mediterranean sea in a way. The border between Ger-
many and Africa is not the border between Austria and Germany. It’s the 
border of Spain. And I think that there is a perception of Germany within a 
common market and that the regions outside of the EU come closer to us. 
And I think it is very important to realise that the awareness of many in Christian Sterzing 
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Germany have c hanged during the last years. And we are very much i n-
volved in the accession process, in the expansion of the EU to the central 
Eastern country and because of our geo-political situation in Europe this 
has a certain priority. But the political class at least in Germany has real-
ised that we as Germans have to care about Mediterranean problems as 
well. And we can’t just say: Well, this is the job of the Southern EU mem-
ber states. We care about Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and let the 
French and Spanish  care about the non-EU Mediterranean states. So this is 
a learning process which of course is not at an end, but I think it’s a grow-
ing sensitivity, a growing interest in problems of the Mediterranean region, 
and there is a growing readiness to get involved in problems of the Medi-
terranean region. So the Mediterranean region is more than a touristic r e-
gion for more and more people in Germany. The perception has changed in 
a way, I think, in the second point that for many people in Germany the 
perception of a  Mediterranean region didn’t exist. There were just a lot of 
different states. And I think there is a growing awareness in Germany of 
the Mediterranean countries as a region. This doesn’t mean that we are not 
aware of the differences of the different problems of the countries. But I 
think we really have a inventive approach of the Barcelona process is the 
regional approach, coming from the knowledge that the cooperation just on 
a bilateral level doesn’t solve the central problems of the future and that we 
do h ave to come to a regional approach. And this doesn’t mean that we 
perceive the region just as a monolithic body, but that we discover a com-
mon interest in this region. In the consequence I think this means that many 
people who realise the common approach to solve these problems, not i g-
noring the individual problems of each country. But bilateral cooperation is 
not enough to tackle all the problems to solve all the challenges.  
The third point I want to mention that in my view many people realised the 
complexity of the region. In many ways there was a certain understanding 
of problems for example Algeria had or Lebanon had, but to create an area 
of stability, of stability of peace, prosperity means an end to the single issue 
policy and single issue outlook countries and the complex nature of the re-
gion and the interdependence on the problems creates the need for a multi-
dimensional, multi-level approach. This I think doesn’t neglect the fact that Germany and the Barcelona-Process 
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the Barcelona process is a very asymmetric partnership. But I think the ex-
perience of the Barcelona process corresponds with a lot of experiences, 
especially the Europeans have made during the last decade with regional 
approaches, for example the Balkan Stability Pact in a way similar regional 
approach tackle certain problems, the cooperation through the candidate 
countries for the EU for a way the similar process we´re dealing with coun-
tries or a region in a multilateral way. And I think these experiences have 
created a new political culture, multilateralism and international coopera-
tion. 
One of the lessons to be drawn so far, I think, nevertheless, what we know 
of the shortcomings so far of the Barcelona process of the European Medi-
terranean partnership, I think this is not a good basis. We have to develop 
and we have to support this general approach, regional approach. Let me 
just point out, let me say, priorities I think should be important for the f u-
ture. 
First of all, the economic cooperation. I think most of us know that the 
economic cooperation between the Southern participants of the Mediterra-
nean partnership is still pretty poor. After the era of free trade association is 
at the beginning. But I think this points to a very central issue. That the re-
gional cooperation has to be supported and I think this is very important 
because this is a way, one way of fighting the asymmetry of the partnership 
in general. So I think within the economic developments of globalisation 
we will come to the point where the European Union should try to initiate a 
more regional cooperation. This should be one of the priorities. In a way I 
would like to say that I don’t think this can be done so much by foreign in-
vestments because of many reasons, but a central point will be to repatriate 
the existing local or regional capital to initiate a new process of regional 
cooperation. Because the pressure will be put on the countries on the eco-
nomic structures of these countries. This will create a new pressure to come 
to economic reform, to come to more mobilisation and to get a more com-
petitive economic structure. So there will be different points of pressure 
and I think the Barcelona process should stress the need of creating more 
regional cooperation. Christian Sterzing 
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The second point I would like to make about the progress or let’s say, the 
lack of progress on human rights’ issues. You all know that this is one of 
the issues of the Barcelona process. As I can see there is no, most of the 
partners are aware of the fact that in this field nothing very much happened 
during the last five years. The rule of law, democracy, human rights – this 
is a private, important matter because I think intensifying the efforts to cre-
ate the awareness in the Southern countries of the centrality of these i ssues 
will help in quite a few other fields of cooperation. So I think the E U 
should make it clear that this willing is ready to put a priority on this, for 
then the progress in this field will be a key for development in many other 
fields, especially the political but also the economic field. I think the rule of 
law, democracy is a central element of political and economic stability in 
the long run. 
The third point is the problem of the domestic political structure. They have 
to face a lot of authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes. There is still the 
underlying contradiction of the partnership that the political and economic 
cooperation being successful would endanger the power and the influence 
of the political elites in many of the countries. It is important to realise that 
in the region we see a change of generation. Many of  the old leaders are 
already gone or are still in power for so many years, the change probably 
will be accepted soon. So I think this is a chance for political change in the 
region because this, as far as we can see, for a few of the countries opens 
the possibility of an evolutionary change to more democracy, to more rule 
of law.  
The fourth point: new Mediterranean partnership has been mainly a dia-
logue on the governmental level. I think this is a very important fact to note 
that the level of civil society – you can read about it in all papers, about the 
Barcelona process, but in reality, a dialogue on this level is just starting. 
And talking about the development of civil society in the countries doesn’t 
mean only to intensify the dialogue between the classical type of NGOs, 
means intensifying the dialogue on the economic level as well, the trade 
union as far as they exist, or other associations because I think we have to 
see this in several parts of a changing society. And I think it is very impor-
tant to put more emphasis on this field. Germany and the Barcelona-Process 
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In the end I would like to mention of course the peace process. Of course it 
is a major stumbling block for a cooperation. It was for the last years. Nev-
ertheless, it was the Barcelona process which still over the years made  it 
possible for the partners of the conflict to meet. So I think we still have to 
stick to the concept that regional cooperation within the Barcelona process 
is a chance of cooperation beyond the conflict. But this is not the common 
view. But I think the E U has to stress the fact that there are so many com-
mon problems but also common interests in the region that we have to do 
everything to initiate and support of the existing regional cooperation, at 
least the dialogue. The peace process of course is essential. We want to ha-
ve progress in the way to economic stability and prosperity and without 
having some kind of final status agreement within the conflicting partners. 
But of course a central question of the European Union is: Whether there is 
willing and readiness to be more active in this field? As far as I can see, the 
EU is not willing to get more involved. Though of course the situation is 
very dramatic, and the global situation has changed. But this I think would 
be a central point for the future of the Barcelona process that the EU is 
willing to be more active, to give initiatives in this field. This I think is not 
only a matter of European interests, but also a matter of European respon-
sibility for the whole region.  
So of course I mentioned a few of the problems and they are big problems. 
There are a lot of challenges that have to be met, that have to be tackled, 
but despite all the criticism of the Barcelona process, despite all the short-
comings we have talked about during the last months, especially around the 
summit of Marseille. I think there are of course still a lot of risks, but there 
a also a lot of changes, chances and I think it is a matter of our political 
readiness and willingness to take the chance.  
 Roderick Pace 
The Mediterranean Enlargement of the Eu-
ropean Union and Its Effect on the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership 
From its very beginning the European Union has had a strong interest in the 
maintenance of peace, stability and good neighbourly relations in the Medi-
terranean region. And for good reason too: many of the member states of 
the EU have a long Mediterranean coast line (France, Greece, Italy and 
Spain) as well as long-standing historic ties with the countries of the Medi-
terranean region. The region is an important outlet for EU exports particu-
larly not least for the northern member states.
1 Furthermore, the Mediterra-
nean region has developed into a strategically important conduit for the 
supply of a substantial part of the Union’s oil and petroleum needs as well 
as a major world maritime highway for the carriage of goods and oil.
2 Envi-
ronmental degradation has a direct bearing on all states of region, not least 
 
1  In 1999, exports by the EU 15 to the Mediterranean Basin countries amounted to 
87.8 billion Euros (11.6%) of total extra-EU exports of the EU, while imports a-
mounted to 63 billion Euros (8.2%) of all extra-EU imports. In 1999, the main EU 
exporters to the Mediterranean Basin countries were Germany - 22%, France 20% 
and Italy 18%. Source: Eurostatistics, Data for Short-Term Economic Analysis. 
Theme 1, General Statistics, (Monthly), European Commission. 
2  It is estimated that 30% of total merchant shipping in the world and 20% of oil 
shipping cross the Mediterranean each year. See, "State and Pressures of the Ma-
rine Coastal Mediterranean Environment", European Environment Agency and 
UNEP, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999, pages 
66-70. Roderick Pace 
  20
among them the key EU member states.
3 A serious maritime disaster in this 
comparatively narrow sea
4 could have immediate negative economic e f-
fects on all states particularly those that have been expanding their income 
and employment from tourism. On the other hand, the expansion of the tou-
rist sector is also increasing the environmental pressures in the region.
5 
Sluggish economic growth when combined with rapid demographic growth 
as in some of the key southern littoral countries could also increase migra-
tory pressures on Europe. In sum, negative developments in the Mediterra-
nean region do not only affect the states of the region themselves, but they 
can also spillover onto the Union itself, sometimes with a knock on effect 
as well. This fact has long been recognised by the Union. 
The Union’s response has been a series of polices, beginning with the Glo-
bal Mediterranean Policy of  the early 1970s and culminating in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the so-called Barcelona Process, which began 
in 1995, in which the EU, acting as a civilian power, has sought to help 
stabilise the region. These policies have periodically been criticised for 
being inadequate. Their main aim is undoubtedly the Union’s own i n-
terests. However, a broad assessment of the effects on the Mediterranean 
Basin countries reveals that indeed the policy has been instrumental in at 
least preserving the traditional t rade outlets and market access for the 
southern littoral states and with laying the foundations for newer forms of 
co-operation across the region. The positive effects of this overlaying cob-
web of relations are already being felt and could possibly intensify in the 
 
3  See for example the Dobris Assessment on the Mediterranean: Stanners D., and 
Bordeau P., (eds.) "Europe's Environment: The Dobris Assessment", European En-
vironment Agency, Copenhagen, 1995,pages 116-121 
4  On average there are 60 maritime accidents per annum in the Mediterranean region, 
with about 15 involving ships causing oil and chemical spills. [ibid., op.cit., UNEP 
and EEA 1999, page 66]. According to the second assessment of Europe's Envi-
ronment, carried out by the European Environmental Agency, there are about 40 oil 
related sites in the Mediterranean region (pipeline terminals, refineries, off-shore 
platforms etc) and an estimated 0.55 and 0.15 billion tonnes of crude oil and petroe-
lum products respectively are loaded and unloaded every year. See "Europe's Envi-
ronment: The Second Assessment", European Environment Agency, Office for Of-
ficial Publications of the European Communities, 1998, page 220. 
5  For a discussion of the environmental effects of tourism on the region, ibid., pages 
49-52. The Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union 
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future, if the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is more successful. Lastly, 
the effects of the EU’s Mediterranean policies had best be judged by refer-
ence to the  anti-monde situation of the absence of such policies. In other 
words, would the countries of the Mediterranean Basin have been better or 
worse off without the EU’s intervention in the region, defective as the latter 
may be?  
It is to the EU's credit that it has not been myopic to the need of constantly 
reviewing its Mediterranean policy. T he 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy 
(GMP) was an attempt to bring some order under a global approach to the 
plethora of agreements that the Community had been concluding with the 
non-member states of the region since the Athens Association Agreement 
of 1961. Following nearly two decades of the GMP, the „new approach“ 
originally announced in 1989, attempted to review the Mediterranean pol-
icy in the light of the second EC enlargement that saw the inclusion of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal in the Community. This  enlargement was per-
ceived by the non-member states as having eroded their preferences in the 
EU. This review was accelerated by developments in central and eastern 
Europe and the Community’s need to restore ‘balance’ in its external rela-
tions, so as not to appear to be tilting too much away from the Mediterra-
nean region and towards its new found partners in the East. Finally, in Sep-
tember of this year, the European Commission published new proposals on 
how the Mediterranean Partnership could be strengthened in the coming 
years.
6 
Another interesting and related process is the EU enlargement and particu-
larly the future accession of Cyprus and Malta, which can occur in the 
short-term, and in the longer run Turkey. From this point onwards, this pa-
per focuses on the possible impact of the accession of Cyprus and Malta in 
the EU on the Mediterranean Partnership. 
 
6  „Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process“, Com (00) 497 final, Brussels, 06/09/2000 Roderick Pace 
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Enlargement 
The EU's enlargement has an external and internal aspect. On the external 
front, the EU's major trading partners, including those of the Mediterranean 
Basin, stand to benefit from a larger single market operating on common 
rules as well as new investment and trading opportunities.
7 Provided, of 
course, that matching national policies are pursued which help partner 
countries realise the opportunities that open up. The accession of Cyprus 
and Malta in the EU also has an internal as well as an external dimension 
from the EU's stand point. Externally, their accession will further extend 
the EU's borders southwards in the region. Internally, the Mediterranean 
group within the EU  - presently composed of five member states, namely 
Spain and Portugal (even if the latter has only an Atlantic coastline), Fran-
ce, Italy and Greece will increase to seven. However, although the number 
of EU Mediterranean countries will increase through the entry of Cyprus 
and Malta, the internal balance in the Union more towards central and eas-
tern Europe. This should not necessarily give cause of concern. When due 
consideration is given to the growing interdependence of the various mem-
ber-states of the Union, as well the broader interests of all member states, 
which are bound to intensify as economic integration deepens and widens, 
then it becomes more worthwhile to consider the EU as a single system 
where any change in one of the parts affects the whole and hence is in eve-
ry member state’s interest. The knock-on effect or shock waves across an 
integrated single system such as the EU has become, means that the 
Mediterranean for example, is not a region that should concern only the 
Mediterranean EU member states, in the same way as central and eastern 
Europe should not be the concern of the states of that sub-region only.
8 In 
addition, consideration must also be given to the fact that the Union is go-
verned by common institutions where the formal equality of all member 
 
7  European Commission, Strategy Paper on Enlargement, November 8, 2000. 
8  It is axiomatic to think on the basis of integration theory that any serious distur-
bance in any one of these regions will be quickly transmitted to the whole of the 
system, while the adverse effects caused will depend of course on the magnitude of 
the impulse. By the same logic, the beneficial effects of the EU's enlargement stand 
to benefit all countries with strong links with the Union. The Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union 
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all member states is not only accepted but enables them to participate in all 
the decisions that are on the agenda.  
However, proximity will continue to play an important role no doubt (e.g. 
Germany taking the lead in central and eastern Europe, France, Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal in the Mediterranean region, Italy in the Balkans etc) 
in shaping the Union’s policies towards third countries. Hence, the division 
of the EU member states into real or imaginary 'clubs' or caucuses remains 
useful for the purpose of analysis, though it must not be treated as a unique 
explanatory variable. 
In light of the above discussion, the entry of Cyprus and Malta in the EU, 
may indeed strengthen the sensitivity of the Union towards the Mediterra-
nean region. The cause of this increased sensitivity derives from two main 
aspects: the small size of the two prospective member states and the fact 
that they are only two wholly Mediterranean states with little other compet-
ing interests apart from the Mediterranean region. By virtue of their small 
size and limited resources, their attention and contribution in the decision-
making institutions of the Union has to be more focused. This 'Mediterra-
nean orientation' is best brought out by this comparison: while the larger 
European Mediterranean states have multiple foreign policy interests, apart 
from what is happening in the Mediterranean region (e.g. the larger EU 
member states are all in one way or the other involved simultaneously in 
developments in the Balkans, Central and eastern Europe and trans-Atlantic 
relations to mention a few) and which divide their attention in international 
relations, the main concerns of Cyprus and Malta and which flow mainly 
from their smallness and vulnerability, are more focused on the matters of 
immediate relevance to them, which begin in the Mediterranean region, if 
not the sub-region of the Mediterranean to which they belong.
9 Their small 
size and their sense of insularity, makes them more sensitive to whatever 
happens in the region than most other states.  
 
9  The argument used here with respect to the European states can be used with equal 
force to the 'multiple' foreign policy interests of the Arab states of the region: e.g. 
Arab politics, African politics etc. Roderick Pace 
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In addition, it must be emphasised that Cyprus and Malta are not only i s-
land states but also the only ones with no physical link with any of the lar-
ger continents (Europe, Africa or Asia) surrounding the Mediterranean. 
Hence their 'Mediterranean orientation' tends to be stronger (although they 
are not totally focused in this direction only). The attitude of the Mediterra-
nean states could perhaps be illustrated by reference to Malta’s first policy 
statement when it joined the  Council of Europe in 1965. Addressing the 
Parliamentary Assembly in 1965, Malta's Prime Minister expressed it this 
way: " Membership of the Council of Europe has been to my country like 
returning home after a long absence…Whilst a European country sharing a 
common culture, history and way of life, we naturally gravitate towards 
Europe, our geographical position makes us aware of the importance of 
North Africa, which shares, with six members of the Council, a common 
sea and which has much to contribute to the welfare of the area. We there-
fore would think of this aspect of European foreign policy could be given 
some more thought."
10 From that point onwards, Malta’s foreign policy 
emphasis has varied from more to less intense preoccupation with the M e-
diterranean region. 
Consider for example the two states' income from tourism, which amounts 
to around 20% of GDP in the case of Cyprus and 22% of GDP in the case 
of Malta. A serious political disturbance in the region and its environs or a 
maritime ecological disaster close to their coasts, could negatively affect 
their economic well-being. The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990-91 has 
supplied ample evidence of how travel and trade in and across the region 
could be negatively affected by a serious disturbance, even on t he region's 
periphery.
11 Furthermore, while every Mediterranean Basin country reaps 
 
10  Malta Today, Department of Information, Malta, September 1965, pages 5-9. 
11  The Bulletin published by the Central Bank of Cyprus in June 1991 (No 111, page 
1), had this to say: "Economic activity during the first quarter of 1991 suffered a 
severe blow from the eruption of the Gulf war…Tourism and related activities, 
which are highly vulnerable under conditions of political and military turmoil, ex-
perienced substantial losses arising from a greatly reduced tourist inflow. The set-
back…was enhanced by an expansion of the trade deficit… (resulting) from re-
duced foreign demand for manufactured goods , particularly in the Arab countries 
and the Middle East…"  The Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union 
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economic dividends from peace and stability, small and economically 
'open' countries such as Cyprus and Malta stand to gain more and risk los-
ing most in the event of turmoil. Indeed the independence of small and 
weak states tends to be most at risk in times of conflict.  
However, being small states, both Cyprus and Malta have a different a p-
proach to their Mediterranean agenda than the larger countries. The inde-
pendence and identity of small states is probably more at risk in an anarchi-
cal international or regional states system, and particularly in times of war, 
than in a "rule-based" one. That is why, small states such as Cyprus and 
Malta are more inclined than larger states  to support and uphold interna-
tional organisations and to act through them in concert with others. Indeed, 
both countries have placed special importance on international organisa-
tions and multilateral negotiations where they have initiated their most n o-
te-worthy foreign policy actions since their independence. The Euro-
Mediterranean partnership is a rule-based international regime that suits 
these two countries' aims and methods in the region to near perfection: the 
partnership facilitates the achievement of more open trade, eventually a 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, it strengthens the links of interdepend-
ence among the region's states, it gives both Cyprus and Malta a freer a c-
cess to the North African and Near Eastern markets, it provides a political 
forum for the discussion of some key regional political issues, strengthens 
confidence-building measures and multiplies the horizontal and vertical 
links of co-operation across the region and keeps both sides of the Mediter-
ranean Basin positively engaged in search of common solutions. In the last 
analysis the partnership is a factor of stability for which there is no alterna-
tive substitute in sight. Furthermore, while the larger EU states can con-
template a national approach to the region in parallel with the EU's unified 
policy, Cyprus and Malta can only act effectively if they do so through a 
larger and more effective policy such as the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Pol-
 
The Economic Survey January-September 1991 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Malta): (page 23) "One of the main factors behind this development (slow down in 
foreign demand) is the slowdown observed in the export of services, particularly 
tourism, associated with the adverse repercussions of the Gulf crisis on the econ-
omy during the first part of the year." Roderick Pace 
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icy. As a result the importance that the two small states attach to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership will always tend to be different from that a t-
tached by the larger EU member states. 
It is also likely that the importance and international standing of both Cy-
prus and Malta will increase in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by vir-
tue of their EU m embership alone, and particularly by the fact that they be-
come direct participants in the formulation and execution of the EU poli-
cies. What remains to be seen is how they will use this new found impor-
tance. Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that both island states are Com-
monwealth countries, they also have long standing relations with the coun-
tries linked to the EU by the Lom‚ Convention, apart from links with Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand and India to mention a few. These relations 
can also become useful to the European Union. 
The question still remains, however, as to what possible role could Cyprus 
and Malta play in the Mediterranean region following enlargement. To b e-
gin with, it is worth observing that for a long time, Cyprus and Malta were 
members o f the non-aligned Movement. Cyprus was one of the founding 
members of the Movement, Malta defined its neutrality, enshrined in the 
Constitution by reference to non-alignment. Although the non-aligned m o-
vement was neither a paradigm of unity (several of its members went to 
war against one another) nor of impeccable correct international behaviour, 
Kissinger accused members of the movement of exploiting East-West r i-
valry, nevertheless it served as a platform for dialogue between a number 
of countries, including practically all those of the southern Mediterranean 
littoral. The small size of Cyprus and Malta, coupled with their past i n-
volvement in the non-aligned Movement and the fact that they neither have 
the means to project power (they do not present a ‘security dilemma’ to 
their neighbours) nor broader ambitions, makes them ideal for the role of 
political ‘brokers’ in the region. The two countries have already had the 
opportunity to play this role during the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe  together with the other members of the group of Euro-
pean Neutral and Non-aligned countries (N + N). As EU members Malta 
and Cyprus will be represented in the EU decision-making institutions 
while enjoying at the same time the trust of their neighbours. The Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union 
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This does not mean that Malta and Cyprus will become the only diplomatic 
bridges between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean Ba-
sin. Cyprus and Malta will still lack the means, diplomatic resources and 
prestige to make meaningful interventions in major problems (such as the 
Middle East, Algeria etc..) But their role could become useful in the event 
of lesser problems that appear difficult to resolve and in lobbying inside the 
EU institutions in favour of Mediterranean initiatives by the EU. Taking 
their CSCE experience as a starting point, Cyprus and Malta could perhaps 
play the role of messengers, intermediaries, „mellowers“, initiators of third 
solutions, providers of a constructive push in times of stalemate and pro-
viders of good offices.
12 A lot will also depend on their role in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) and the level of prestige 
they manage to build up in this EU pillar. Both applicant states claim to be 
ready to take on the CFSP acquis. Participation in the so called Petersberg 
tasks which are consonant with the preferred p olicies of neutral and non-
aligned states will also increase their ability to play the roles described 
above. However, as long as they remain out of the EU, they can never mus-
ter the importance in international affairs or in the EU institutions them-
selves to be in a position to play such a role. 
Conclusion 
The accession of Cyprus and Malta in the EU does not threaten the Union 
with insurmountable problems and nor is it likely to negatively affect the 
EU’s partners in the Mediterranean region. Their entry will also increase 
the Mediterranean group of states in the Union, but does not threaten the 
overall balance of the Union. As small states they may be regarded as help-
less in advancing their international agenda. However, they also possess 
strengths which derive from their smallness. Hence, their stronger f ocus on 
their immediate environment, the Mediterranean, and a limited foreign rela-
tions agenda, the lack of broader distractions, coupled with their friendly 
 
12  This is the role that the N+N group played in the CSCE according to Anton Bebler 
in „The NN Group in the New European Security Architecture“, The International 
Spectator, IAI, Rome, Volume XXVII, No 1, January-March, 1992, page 72. Roderick Pace 
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relations with neighbouring countries, the fact that both applicants have a 
recent colonial experience (having suffered hegemony, not exercised it) 
which they share with their neighbours, their experience in the non-aligned 
movement and the experience of their participation in the CSCE, all help 
them to take on a very positive role in the EU and in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It may also be argued convincingly, that Cyp-
riot and Maltese EU membership will benefit more the southern Mediterra-
nean non-member states in dealing with the EU, than if the two small a p-
plicant island states stay out. The dynamics of the next Mediterranean e n-
largement of the EU to include Cyprus and Malta exhibit a few noteable 
advantages as argued in this paper  that are significant, despite the small si-
ze of these applicants. 
 
 Mark A. Heller 
Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
In addressing Israel’s approach to the Barcelona Process, two preliminary 
remarks are useful. The first is that public awareness of the process is very 
low. It is fair to suggest that most Israelis, even those who do take an inter-
est in current affairs, do not know of its existence. It is certainly the case 
that very few know about the Marseilles meeting. Interest and concern are 
confined to  a small group of people working in the government, in acade-
mia and NGOs, and in the business sector. As a result, the following com-
ments are basically a distillation of conversations with these kinds of peo-
ple and of the occasional commentary that leaks into the media, almost ne-
ver on the front page. 
A second preamble that may-be helpful in setting the context refers to the 
circumstances in which Barcelona was born. That happened about one 
month after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. De-
spite the clouds already hanging over people’s heads, there was still some 
belief that things in Israel’s part of the world were generally moving in 
positive directions. At the outset, there was therefore a hopeful, even e n-
thusiastic approach to this  experiment with respect to anticipated develop-
ments on both sides of the Mediterranean. 
Concerning the South, the expectation was that the Barcelona process 
would act as a kind of a supplement or reinforcement to the greater 
momentum towards regional cooperation that was also manifested at the 
time in the ongoing multilateral negotiations connected with the Madrid 
peace process. In fact, by that time, i.e., at the end of 1995, many of these 
multilaterals were limping; one of them  – the Arms Control and Regional 
Security (ACRS) Working Group had already been suspended. The hope Marc A. Heller 
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rity (ACRS) Working Group had already been suspended. The hope existed 
that Barcelona could come along and partially fill the gap that was opening 
up because of the fact that the multilaterals were not proceeding as quickly 
or as productively as people had expected. Besides, there was general iden-
tification with the objectives that were defined in the baskets of the declara-
tion: the political and security partnership, the economic and financial part-
nership, and the partnership in social, cultural a nd human affairs. Not that 
Israel anticipated any direct economic benefit from the partnership. Instead, 
it hoped this mechanism or structure would stimulate greater inter-action 
between the partners and promote some kind of normalisation of r elations, 
in  the economic sphere as well as in a host of confidence- and security-
building measures. Most importantly, there was hope that Barcelona would 
constitute an explicit acknowledgement by all the partners that there could 
be cooperation for mutual benefit on i ssues of common interest, not as a 
substitute for progress in the bilateral peace negotiations, but not condi-
tional on it, either. 
As far as the view of the North side of the Mediterranean was concerned, 
Barcelona was also viewed positively, in the sense t hat it seemed to signal 
a more inclusive European approach than had been pursued hitherto. In 
other words, it seemed to emerge as a replacement for previous Mediterra-
nean-directed European initiatives  -- the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the 5 + 5, or 
other kinds of multilateral institutions or structures from which Israel had 
been obviously excluded. In short, Barcelona was seen positively, not only 
because of its objectives per se were promising, but also because it might 
provide a vehicle for the deepening or improvement of relations between 
Israel and the EU. 
Five years later, it can be said, at the risk of understatement, that attitudes 
are a bit less sanguine. If the expectations were as I have described them, 
then things haven’t worked out as hoped. With respect to the South, the 
partnership is not seen as supporting the peace process (i.e., as a kind of 
replacement for the multilaterals); it’s not even seen as proceeding inde-
pendently of the peace process. Instead a situation has developed in which 
at least some of the Arab partners seem to interpret the Partnership, not as a 
mechanism for promoting common objectives for the mutual benefit of all Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
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concerned, but simply as another kind of normalisation, which they view as 
a prize for Israeli compliance with their  demands. And so over the course 
of time, a situation developed in which the Partnership is in some sense 
held hostage to the peace process. Now, that’s obviously not the only ob-
stacle. It could be argued that it’s not even the most important obstacle. But 
it is certainly seen as the most salient problem from the perspective of I s-
rael. 
And looking North, the more commonly held Israeli view now is that E u-
rope is fighting a rear guard battle against the intrusion of the peace process 
into Barcelona, but without much success and sometimes without much 
enthusiasm. As a result, the peace process dominates a lot of the procee-
dings of the Partnership. And in some cases, that has even spilled over into 
bilateral Israeli-EU relations. For example, there has been a very long delay 
in the entry into force of the Israel-EU Association Agreement. This is con-
sidered one of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, i.e., a 
function of Barcelona, although it was negotiated in 1995 before the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership came into being. Because ratification by some 
European members was held up, the Agreement didn’t actually go into e f-
fect until June of 2000. 
Another symptom is the lack of movement on another outstanding bilateral 
issue: the reference made in the Essen D eclaration of 1994 to Israel’s “sta-
tut priviligié” with respect to the EU. No content has been put into that, and 
one reason is that since the formation of the EMP, there is a concern that 
putting some meat on the bare bones of the Essen Declaration would make 
Israel resemble a European non-member country more than a Medi-
terranean non-member country, thereby provoking protests of other Medi-
terranean protests and adversely impacting the Partnership. 
As a result of all these developments, we find ourselves in early 2001 fac-
ing a situation where Israel (like many other EMP members, though for 
different reasons) feels some loss of enthusiasm for, even disillusionment 
with, the original Barcelona idea. By and large, the approach of those peo-
ple interested in Barcelona is still positive, in the sense that they continue 
to participate in the Partnership’s activities and try to take an active role in Marc A. Heller 
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at least some of the things it is intended to do. But the major focus has 
shifted, and Israel’s interest now rests on  two approaches. The first is e n-
courage the delinking of Partnership activities from the peace process, i.e., 
to encourage a situation in which Barcelona is not held hostage to the peace 
process. But if that proves impossible despite the efforts of Israel or anyone 
else, the alternative is to encourage the delinking of the bilateral EU-Israeli 
relationship from the progress of the EMP. 
 
 Volker Perthes 
Making the Barcelona-Process more flexible 
The short answer to the question of flexibility is of course that the Barce-
lona process is not rigid  - it is quite flexible already. The longer answer 
probably takes a little bit more time. 
Today, the major problems of the Barcelona process may be described as a 
lack of enthusiasm which we have seen transpiring from b asically all par-
ticipant sides, and which is not so much a result of lack of flexibility but 
rather reflects disappointments on all sides. Very briefly, the partners in the 
South are disappointed that funds are scarce, that the measures to get dis-
bursements are complicated which in the end makes funds even scarcer, 
and that individual EU states are blocking association agreements – like the 
one with Jordan that is still not ratified. And the EU-side in general is dis-
appointed that the peace process is so much an obstacle to Barcelona. Eu-
ropean policy makers always hoped that with the Arab-Israeli conflict 
could be de-linked from the Barcelona process. But as we have seen it is 
not possible to pretend that there was no linkage. The European side is also 
disappointed that security cooperation and the establishment of confidence 
and security-building measures has been dismal so far. And it is disap-
pointed that any meaningful dialogue on human rights issues, on terrorism, 
on migration has yet to be established. 
Seeing all these disappointments I think we should not forget that all the 
major moves  – be it in European-Mediterranean partnership or in Europe’s 
policies toward its Mediterranean environment  – took place when optimism 
was high. Not only was Barcelona launched in 1995 when there was huge 
optimism on all sides with regard to the peace process. Also when we look 
at when the Common Strategy of the European Union from last summer, Volker Perthes 
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summer 2000, it was again adopted in a phase when everybody thought: 
Well, now w e are close to a breakthrough and there will be progress in the 
peace process.  
In addition to that, optimism was generally displayed in at least three a s-
pects: one, in the political security fields  - the so-called first basket  – 
European policies were driven by, as I tend to say as “functionalist”, opti-
mism or “functionalist illusion” that remaining territorial conflicts could be 
overcome by regional cooperation in functional fields, such as industry, 
environment etc. And that meaningful cooperation could  be established 
even before the peace process was brought to an end. Two, in the economic 
basket the basic optimism driving the partnership was that all the economic 
recipes from the international financial institutions regarding free trade and 
liberalization would work. It was clearly stated: Yes, it will work  – only in 
some points there will be difficulties. And it only needs some funds from 
the European Union and some encouragement from the European Union to 
overcome the fears of penetration, the fears of marginalisations, of fears of 
dependency, which of course were there from the beginning amongst the 
Southern partner states. Three, in the social cultural field there was the ho-
pe that the process would have a major impact on democratisation, civil 
society empowerment etc.  
So I guess in retrospect, or after 5 years, we could say that those who were 
a little bit more skeptic at that time were vindicated. And we have to be 
more realistic if we want to speak about flexibility or new measures. Real-
istic also in the sense and very much in the sense of realist school of inter-
national relations, mainly because regional relations in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East are closer to the realistic pattern than to the functionalist 
pattern which we, in Europe, were used to. The problems are obvious. Me-
aningful cooperation has not been achieved, at least not in the security 
field. There is strong resistance on the part of some Arab countries and so-
cieties to any cooperation that involves Israel, at least at this stage. There is 
strong resistance on the part of economic actors in the South and in the 
North against some of the elements that would have economic impacts or 
increase the participation of society. The participation of society as such is 
very limited. The process is not present in the minds of the people. The Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
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people in Israel or in the Arab states don’t even know (in their majority) 
what the Barcelona process is. They know what Europe is. They may be 
aware of certain things which are part of this process but not necessarily of 
the Barcelona process as such.  
There would be more to say of course as there are also obvious achieve-
ments. However, if we want to speak about more flexibility and new i n-
struments or revising some of the instruments we might actually start f rom 
some of these problems I mentioned. And therefore I would sort of try to 
organise my ideas, which are only initial ideas, around these themes. The 
first point will be the question of multilateralism or: comprehensive multi-
lateralism versus bilateral relations and subregional cooperation. The sec-
ond point will be the subregional cooperation and decentralisation, and 
third there will be the question how to get society to participate in the proc-
ess.  
Regarding the first point, what should be considered is whether multilater-
alism in the Barcelona process actually has to be comprehensive all the 
time, and whether it is still the main approach we should follow. One of the 
central elements in the European approach to the Mediterranean Partner-
ship has been to further comprehensive regional cooperation, particularly 
with Israel and Arab states involved at the same time. As a matter of fact, 
this insistence on comprehensive multilateralism, at times at least, made 
both Israelis and Arabs unhappy. The Israelis didn’t like to be treated just 
as another  Arab state, on the same footing like the Arabs in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership. And the Arab states didn’t want their relations 
to Europe to be conditioned on the peace process or on their preparedness 
to normalise r elations with Israel. Probably for that reason we should give 
more weight in the future, at least for the time being, to what we sometimes 
call the “pluri-bilateral” aspects of the EU-partnership, i.e., cooperation be-
tween the EU on the one hand and individual partner states on the other as 
well as subregional cooperation, rather than insisting on a comprehensive 
multilateral approach which nobody really wants at the moment. Now this 
would certainly not be, it would explicitly not be to isolate Israel. I srael 
cannot but isolate itself. But this strategy would have the clear aim of 
strengthening the cooperative capacities of individual Arab states or, to put Volker Perthes 
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it differently, to reduce existing asymmetries by not only strengthening the 
economic capacities of those states, but also their administrative, diplo-
matic and the political ones in order to make them more prepared for and to 
make it easier for them to think about comprehensive cooperation at a ma-
ture stage and also to reduce fears of Israeli domination.  
On the instrumental level, we have to speak about dialogues, and how to 
broaden them. I will come back to that in the end. And we should probably 
try to find out whether individual Arab states or individual Arab institutions 
could be introduced into some EU activities, such as the Fifth Research and 
Development Framework Program. For the time being only Israel is part of 
it, which of course leads to complaints on the Arab side about special 
treatment for Israel. Of course there is some special treatment for Israel he-
re. It is clear that there are huge technological divides between Israel and 
most of the Arab states. But I’m sure that we could find individual aca-
demic or scientific institutions from Arab states that could be associated to 
this framework agreement, not in all Arab states, but certainly in Egypt, 
Morocco and probably Lebanon. 
Now my second point, the question of subregionalisation and decentralisa-
tion. When the Commission speaks of flexibility, and it does so in its own 
evaluation of the process, it usually puts the focus on subregional coopera-
tion. And it’s certainly true that any number of partner states should be en-
couraged to set up cooperative institutions between themselves in coopera-
tion with individual EU states. The question which I w ould like to raise 
simply as a point of discussion is whether for subregional cooperative ven-
tures there really should be a minimum number of states required, and 
whether it would always be necessary to have a EU state in such a subre-
gional venture. Couldn’t we also allow for funding from the MEDA pro-
gramme, under the EMP, for cooperative ventures simply of two or three or 
four partner states without necessarily a EU state being directly involved. 
Perhaps we will have to differentiate here: in the political and security 
field, we will likely have to maintain the condition that for any cooperative 
venture all the twenty seven participant states should be invited or the se-
ven should be invited at least lest the venture be seen as divisive by some. 
Also, such v entures should involve a combination of partner states and EU Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
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and EU states. But I’m not sure whether the same goes for ventures in the 
economic field, the economic basket or the cultural basket. I’ll give you 
one or two examples because I think it would make sense for the MEDA-
fund or for the EU to support subregional cooperative ventures where we 
do not necessarily need an EU partner state to be involved. If, e.g., the Arab 
Maghreb Union, the UMA, was to be revived and they would build up a 
UMA free trade zone, couldn’t that be something which could be counted 
as being among the subregional ventures in the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership? Or if a number of two, three, four Arab states would say: Let’s 
link our export offensives, or let’s link our efforts to encourage exports to 
the EU, would we necessarily need a EU partner in here? Or if, as the 
Patten-Report states, one of the major successes in the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership is the Social Fund for Development in Egypt  - I don’t know 
too much about the Social Fund for Development, but I’m taking it as 
granted, as it goes in the Patten-Report, that this is a major success of 
European support - if that is the case, wouldn’t it be wise to have Egyptian 
experts trying to set up similar funds in Syria or in Morocco or in Tunisia 
for example. That probably would be cheaper, it could be funded through 
the MEDA-Program and it wouldn’t necessarily need a EU partner i n-
volved and it would still be a subregional venture.  
And another point closely related to the subregional issue, is the question of 
decentralisation. The suggestion from the Commission is clearly to be more 
supportive of institutions below the nation-state level. It is certainly expe-
dient to explore further how municipalities and regional councils could be 
brought into the partnership. One other important phenomenon that should 
be studied are regional markets, markets at crossing points which do not 
only have an economic function, but very often also have a societal and a 
cultural one.  
The European Parliament has demanded – and I think rightly so – that the 
EU-Programs that have been stopped in 1995, the decentralised programs 
such as Med-Urbs and Med-Media, Med-Campus be relaunched and I think 
it is necessary that they be relaunched. What happened was that because of 
corruption problems here in the EU, we prevent some people from the Volker Perthes 
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chance to benefit from funds which have been considered very useful by 
basically all participants.  
Decentralisation should certainly also pertain to bilateral relations between 
Europe on the one hand and a partner state on the other. When it comes to 
aid or financial support as outlined in the so-called National Indicative Pro-
grams for each partner country, the Commission Report made it clear that it 
wants to decentralise programs by basically entrusting the European dele-
gations in the partner countries with everything. This may be wise and a c-
tually create more flexibility in a sense. At the same time I think we should 
ask whether it is actually wise to have all phases of a program being chan-
nelled through the same institution, which would mean to have the Euro-
pean delegation being in charge of the identification, of the selection, of the 
execution, of the evaluation and even of the follow-up of a certain program.  
I’m not convinced by the suggestion of the Patten-Report (“Reinvigorating 
the Barcelona Process”) where it says that in terms of aid, Europe should in 
future concentrate on, and I quote: “on a small number of strategic pro-
grams whereas small programs would no longer be funded”. I think this 
would in the end go against the aim of having more flexibility and more 
involvement. I think that if the aim really is to reach a higher number of 
people and not only the usual suspects, the usual beneficiaries of the Euro-
Med-Program  - whom we basically all know, I mean, they meet in Bonn, 
they meet in Malta, they meet sometimes even in Arab, North-African 
countries, it’s professional NGO-actors whom we know, plus the diplomats 
of course  -, so if we want programs not only to reach the usual suspects, 
the EMP professionals from the North and South, then I think micro-
projects would have special importance, and the EU-Commission should 
reconsider the idea to only fund strategic projects. Of course we all know 
that micro-projects are more l abour intensive for those who launch them, 
who evaluate them, but I think many things could be outsourced here to 
less professional actors and NGOs in order to get more non-governmental 
actors on board. And I would even suggest that rather than doing away with 
micro-projects which is the tendency in the Commission now, a certain 
percentage of the National Indicative Programs should be reserved for m i-
cro projects. Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
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My third point: How do we broaden participation in the Euro-Med partner-
ship in general? Again I  think the Commission is right in its report when it 
says, and I quote some things the Commission has actually quoted from the 
EuroMesCo network: A sense of common ownership has not yet been de-
veloped by all participants; we have to promote a sense of common owner-
ship of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership at the societal level  in the 27 
countries. The number of persons involved in the Barcelona Process is very 
limited so far  – it’s a narrow elite of officials and societal actors. We can-
not blame any particular side for this but we can state how it is and we can 
state reasons for the narrowness of participation. Partly of course it is cau-
sed by the structure of international relations in the Euro-Med relation, 
which are relations between states in the end. To some extent it is deter-
mined by the financing relations and the financing procedures of the Euro-
pean Union which makes it very, very difficult for small organisations to 
participate, because basically you have to finance projects in advance. You 
sometimes wait one year, two years until you get a positive financial deci-
sion and a contract by the European Commission. But actors, NGOs that 
are set up more or less spontaneously, cannot wait one or two or three years 
for a financial agreement or a financial contract and the actual financing 
from the European Commission. And partly of course the limits to partici-
pation are also a result of political structures in the partner countries, the 
main partner countries who don’t want their citizens to participate in such 
activities that aren’t under the control of the government themselves.  
So what can we do to broaden participation? This is only a couple of unor-
ganised ideas. I already mentioned the necessity to facilitate micro-projects. 
Furthermore I think we haven’t made enough use of migrant communities 
from partner countries that live in our own countries. Migrant communities 
seen not in the sense of only being the object of discussion, as in “danger of 
migration” sort of arguments. But migrant communities as active agents 
who would often like to repatriate some of the skills they have developed 
while being migrants in European countries who could bring these skills 
back to their countries and be sort of translators of skills, of knowledge, of 
expertise. If we would make more use of migrant communities, we would 
probably also save some money on experts because many of these people Volker Perthes 
  40
would be prepared to go back to their country not for an expert salary, but 
for a good European salary. So it would also be financially effective.  
Another question that has to be tackled is one of the ideas which again have 
been developed in the EuroMesCo network  - we are not claiming a copy-
right, but we are happy that the External-Relations Committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament has adopted it  – is to create a special visa for all persons 
involved in the partnership activities so as to make it easier for someone 
who wants to participate in a conference like this or another “Barcelona-
related” activity to get a direct and quick visa to come to Europe. It still is 
very difficult for participants from some countries.  
There possibly also is a way – let me be trivial a little bit – to spread more 
knowledge about what the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is. We have to 
use the potential of popular culture which is not used by the partnership 
until now. I remember that when I was an early teen, a few decades ago or 
so, my idea of what Europe, what the European Community as it was called 
at the time was, was pretty much furthered by the so-called European Song 
Contest. It was a yearly event, certainly not very intellectual, and there 
were all these young people following it, and there was a Eurovision mel-
ody and things like that. So for someone who was in his early teens, for my 
generation, it contributed to create the idea of Europe. It’s very trivial, but 
when will we organize something like that in the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership – a Euro-Med Song Festival? As we know that the popular culture 
from the North is consumed in the South anyway and now we are having 
popular culture from Algeria or from Turkey being consumed in Germany, 
why not making something like that a regular event? It doesn’t need more 
than one television station from every country participating. Israelis are 
participating in the European Contest anyway, Moroccans have been par-
ticipating in one or two of these Song Festivals.  
Now back from trivial things to politics. And this is my last point. I think 
we have to find a new format for what is called the “enhanced political dia-
logues” i n the bilateral association agreements. Now since the name “en-
hanced political dialogues” is already taken, we might find a new name or a 
new concept for it. But the essential point is that these official dialogues as Israel and the Barcelona-Process 
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foreseen under the association agreements tend to be rather sterile. A real 
discussion is not taking place which leads to the Foreign Minister of the 
partner country showing up but hardly a Foreign Minister of the EU coun-
tries showing up, which leads to more disappointment on the Southern side 
and makes the dialogue even more sterile and formal. So I think we need 
political dialogues, expressly political dialogues, with a broader involve-
ment. I’m thinking of something like regular meetings on a yearly basis 
between Europe and individual partner countries which would be probably 
led by NGOs, by institutes like yours or others and involve policy-makers 
as well as journalists as well as people from cultural fields, academics of 
course, and officials to allow for a sort of behind-the-door, open, regular 
dialogue. And let us concentrate on younger people here in order to build 
the real strategic partnerships, create a community that is i nterested in those 
bilateral relations  - truly bilateral relations between Europeans on the one 
hand and individual partner countries on the other.  
To finish, I think before we actually discuss new instruments and discuss 
flexibility, we would probably have to ask ourselves very, very seriously on 
both sides of the Mediterranean whether we really want more than a free 
trade zone and economic aid. Maybe in the end we are all happy with a free 
trade zone and economic aid. It might only be a couple of academics like us 
who really think we would need much more than that: that we really should 
build a region, that we really  should build trans-Mediterranean structures. 
Now if it is the case that the majority of the policy-makers and the societies 
only want free trade and aid, then of course we would say: Let’s have a 
clear priority, and let’s wait with the rest until there really is ripeness and 
enough willingness on all sides to go forward. Europeans often have doubts 
that our partners in the South want to build real trans-Mediterranean struc-
tures which includes confidence building and all that. We shouldn’t ignore 
that the Southern partners, too, have real doubts: doubts about the European 
sincerity. Apparently the European Common Strategy which was adopted 
in June last year, was not even discussed or presented to the partner states 
in the Mediterranean region. At least this i s the impression on the Southern 
side. And if this impression reflects reality, I really would say that the EU 
side was not so sincere regarding its cooperative spirit. Of course it is a EU Volker Perthes 
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strategy and we don’t need the partner states to approve of it or to be able 
to veto it. But if we are speaking so much about dialogues and transpar-
ency, it could at least have been presented in some way to the Southern 
partners. Because if you read the Common Strategy closely, you realize 
that in the end it contains a l ot of paragraphs that state what the partner 
states should do. So if we have a strategy which says what the partner states 
should do, we should at least have discussed the text with them. ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
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